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I. INTRODUCTION
A long-standing concern surrounding the performance of the UK economy is its
perceived failure to maintain the same technological pace as its competitors.
Industrial research and development (R&D) expenditure
2 as a proportion of GDP
fell during the 1980s at a time when all other G7 countries increased the
proportion of their output given over to R&D. This ratio is now lower in the UK
than in most other G7 countries. If this world-wide trend toward more R&D
indicates that industrial production is becoming increasingly science-based, then
the UK may be in danger of becoming a relatively low-tech economy. One
purpose of this article is to examine whether there is a rational basis for these
fears.
The explicit policy of the UK government has been to move away from the
direct funding of R&D. The recent White Paper on Science and Technology
3
emphasised diffusion and technology transfer as the key policy initiative.
                                                                                                                                   
1 Rachel Griffith is a Senior Research Officer at the Institute for Fiscal Studies; Daniel Sandler is a Research
Fellow of the Institute for Fiscal Studies and of the Chartered Institute of Taxation, and in the Faculty of Law,
University of Cambridge; John Van Reenen is a Project Manager at the Institute for Fiscal Studies and a
Lecturer at University College London.
The authors would like to thank Richard Blundell, Michael Devereux, Naercio Menezes Filho, Annette Ryan
and participants in the OECD conference on fiscal incentives for R&D and the 1994 Industrial Economists
Study Group meeting at the London Business School. This work is part of a programme of research at the
ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Fiscal Policy at the Institute for Fiscal Studies.
2 This refers to business expenditure on research and development (BERD) performed in the UK (by UK firms
and others). It includes government-funded R&D performed by the corporate sector, but not publicly performed
R&D (in universities or by the Ministry of Defence, for example).
3 ‘The Government does not consider there to be a case for general tax incentives for spending on R&D’
(HMSO, 1993, p. 13).Fiscal Studies
22
Reacting to this, the Commons Science and Technology Committee
4 has called
for a review of the case for fiscal incentives to increase the level of business
expenditure on R&D. It points to recent studies in the US indicating that the
gains in new R&D have been at least equal to, if not greater than, the revenue
cost of the incremental tax credit. However, one cannot simply say that what has
been successful in the US will necessarily be successful elsewhere. The UK, like
most other European nations, has a relatively small and open economy and many
of the firms that would benefit from a tax incentive do much of their R&D
overseas.
In considering the introduction of new fiscal incentives for R&D, it is
important to be clear about which activities such incentives are meant to
encourage and whether the tax system is the most appropriate policy tool. There
are also substantial design and implementation difficulties that need to be
considered. Empirical studies of the impact of the US tax credit emphasise its
distortionary nature, with many companies facing a negative effective credit
giving them a disincentive to invest in R&D.
5 This surprising asymmetric impact
on firms arises because of the structure of the credit and is detailed below (see
Section VI). The design problems cannot be dismissed merely as administrative
details.
The focus of this article is on the role of R&D-related tax incentives. There
are many aspects of the tax system that may indirectly affect the cost of R&D
which are not considered, such as subsidies for complementary assets to R&D
(for example, training). Tax incentives are only one way in which the
government can affect the amount of R&D undertaken and its economic impact.
Technology policies that encourage the diffusion of innovation, increase the
level of private reward through patenting arrangements and provide easier access
to finance through low- interest or government secured loans may all affect the
level, location and type of R&D that is carried out.
A host of incentives exist that are targeted at specific regions (areas of high
unemployment, for example) or industries. These types of incentives are based
on more direct government intervention and are not the subject of this article.
The emphasis here is on general tax incentives that provide a subsidy to R&D
spending relative to other forms of investment. In examining the impact of a tax
incentive on the amount of R&D conducted, it is necessary to know how it
affects the price of R&D and how firms respond to this change in price. Given
knowledge of these effects, it is possible to estimate whether the revenue forgone
is less than or equal to the amount of private sector R&D generated. Ideally, a
further calculation would measure the extra spillover benefits created by the
additional R&D. Unfortunately, in the absence of sufficient information
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regarding such macroeconomic effects, most research has fallen back on the
simpler yardstick of examining whether £1 of tax credit generates at least £1 of
additional R&D.
Section II outlines the reasons why society might want to subsidise R&D and
discusses their implications for policy design. Section III briefly outlines the
patterns of R&D spending. Section IV sets out the current tax treatment of R&D
in several OECD countries, and Section V details the impact of tax on the cost of
doing R&D. Issues arising about the design and implementation of fiscal
incentives are discussed in Section VI, and Section VII looks at the impact of
differences in the price of R&D. Conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
II. WHY SUBSIDISE R&D?
Technological progress has long been seen as the engine of economic growth.
Schumpeter (1942) popularised the idea that capitalism’s great strength lay in
dynamic efficiency — innovation leads to greater productivity and the possibility
of a larger quantity and variety of goods at lower cost. This view contrasts with
the traditional economic concept of static efficiency which concerns the optimal
allocation of resources in any one time period. Econometric work tracking the
factors responsible for productivity growth generally find a large role for
technical progress.
6
R&D spending has risen across the industrialised world and, in particular,
industrial R&D performed and largely financed by business enterprises has
shown a remarkable increase. In 1985, $155.2 billion was spent on industrial
R&D in the OECD countries, and there was an average annual real growth rate
of 6 per cent between 1975 and 1985 (OECD, 1989). This increase was faster
than average GDP growth and most countries have seen a rise in the ratio of
R&D to GDP or physical capital. Most commentators attribute this trend to a
global movement towards more science-based production in the industrialised
nations, especially in manufacturing.
However, the overall rise disguises a large variation in performance between
countries. Table 1 shows that the growth of R&D intensity has been much
greater in some countries — Japan, for example — than in others, such as the
UK. In fact, the UK is the only country to show a decline during the 1981–91
period amongst the G7 countries (these countries accounted for 91 per cent of
total OECD R&D in 1985).
This decline has led many to call for greater tax breaks for R&D. Underlying
this demand is the assumption that the market is failing to provide the correct
incentives for firms to invest in R&D, and that government can successfully
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intervene. There are several possible reasons why the market may be failing to
provide enough R&D investment and the policy implications of each are quite
different. Tax policies may provide a viable means of overcoming certain market
failings, but may make matters worse for other sorts of market failure. The main
economic argument in favour of government support for industrial R&D, which
is based on the idea that society benefits from this R&D via ‘spillovers’, is
considered first, and then rationales due to further market failures are discussed.
TABLE 1
Industrial R&D as a Proportion of GDP
1974 1981 1991
Canada 0.41 0.60 0.81
France 1.04 1.12 1.48
Germany 1.29 1.71 1.87
Japan 1.18 1.41 2.16
UK
a 1.36 1.49 1.28
US 1.57 1.71 2.07
a UK figures exclude UK Atomic Energy Authority in all years (official figures include them after 1986).
Source: OECD, 1994.
Technological spillovers occur when the research activities of one firm
induce higher productivity in other firms. To the extent that knowledge cannot
be fully appropriated, there will generally be an underinvestment in R&D. Even
with patent protection, imitators can often copy without having to fully
compensate the original innovator for the costs of research and first
commercialisation of new ideas. There is a substantial body of both econometric
and case-study evidence supporting the existence of spillovers.
7 Whatever the
precise nature of the way spillovers are diffused, in a closed economy the classic
solution to the spillover problem is for government to subsidise R&D to bring
the marginal private rate of return up to the marginal social rate of return.
It may be, however, that even in this simple case, a tax subsidy is not the
appropriate tool. The patents system was designed to increase the appropriability
companies have over their own research. Nevertheless, it is clear that patents are
a relatively poor way of ensuring appropriability outside of a few particular
industries, such as pharmaceuticals.
8 In recent years, R&D Joint Ventures
(RJVs) have been touted as a private sector response to the spillover problem.
Under an RJV, companies agree to partially pool their informational resources
and, if all the potential beneficiaries from spillovers are in the RJV, the public
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good may effectively turn into a private one.
9 The major problem with
encouraging joint ventures, of course, is the opportunity it gives for firms to
enhance their market power through collusive activities.
In an integrated and open economy, where multinationals conduct R&D and
business abroad and foreign firms conduct R&D and business domestically, it is
questionable exactly which activities a government would want to subsidise. The
general presumption is that domestically performed R&D is important, as
spillovers are geographically clustered around where the research takes place.
Although there is some evidence supporting this proposition,
10 there are also
substantial international spillovers in productivity.
11 Additionally, R&D may be
performed in one country but the innovations produced in another. The
beneficial employment effects of R&D for skilled workers, for example, are
more likely to come from the production of high-technology goods rather than
R&D per se. This opens up the opportunity for some countries to ‘free ride’ on
the R&D efforts of other countries. This result may be entirely rational for an
individual country, but will be inefficient from a global perspective.
Another reason for placing little weight on where firms do their R&D is the
fact that these firms will, presumably, conduct their R&D in the location that
maximises profits. Since R&D is considered more productive there than
elsewhere, why interfere with market choice? The problem with using tax
incentives to benefit local multinationals is that it is unclear what a ‘French’,
‘Dutch’ or ‘British’ multinational really is. The shareholders of multinational
corporations are dispersed over many countries. To the extent that policymakers
are concerned about the welfare of only their own citizens (i.e. as shareholders in
multinational corporations), enhancing the profitability of multinationals that
happen to have their headquarters based in their country may only have very
indirect social value.
Those who stress the locational importance of R&D do not only rely on
arguments based on the geographical clustering of R&D spillovers to
productivity. More domestic R&D could also generate more employment and
higher wages. These benefits are likely to affect skilled workers
disproportionately, as numerous studies have shown that new technology tends
to increase the demand for human capital.
12 Skilled workers are generally in
short supply, and it is doubtful whether increasing their demand through
increased R&D is desirable without first addressing the apparent failures in the
training and education systems.
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A further argument in favour of increasing R&D expenditure is that a wider
base of firms conducting R&D domestically could enhance an economy’s ability
to imitate R&D conducted in other countries. There is certainly evidence at the
microeconomic level indicating that firms need to be doing some R&D in order
to capture R&D spillovers.
13 One needs a scientist who can at least understand
the latest advances in his or her field in order to begin developing new products
based upon those advances.
All of these arguments raise the question of what parts of a company one
wants to attract to the UK — the headquarters, the R&D laboratory or the
manufacturing plant? Is there anything that is intrinsically special about R&D?
Like other forms of investment incentives, R&D tax credits raise issues of tax
rivalry. Nations may bid against each other to attract R&D laboratories, with the
associated drain on the taxpayer.
The strongest case for a tax-privileged treatment of R&D is based on some
version of the spillover argument. Yet there are other market failures that might
lead to an underinvestment in R&D. The lack of skilled workers has already
been noted. In addition, R&D relies heavily on internal funding and there are
many reasons why markets may not be working to provide adequate financing.
14
Tax measures that increase a firm’s cash flow may therefore increase R&D
investment. One of the problems with providing a subsidy to R&D through the
tax system is that it may not benefit the businesses that need it most — for
example, small, growing firms that are liquidity-constrained but do not have tax
liability against which to offset a tax credit. Fundamentally, if one believes that
financial markets are at the heart of the problem, then acting on this market
failure is the more appropriate policy response. Similarly, if it is the skills
shortage that is holding back R&D investment, then it is training policy, not
R&D policy, that should be tackled. Those calling for R&D tax credits must be
clear that this solution adequately tackles the actual cause of the shortfall in
R&D spending, and that a tax credit is the appropriate fiscal response.
Otherwise, R&D tax credits are acting on a symptom rather than the disease.
III. PATTERNS OF R&D INVESTMENT
As emphasised in the introduction, not only has real R&D grown over time along
with other forms of investment, but it has also grown faster. The proportion of
GDP given over to R&D has increased across the industrialised world, primarily
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because production has become more science-based. Differences in the average
level of R&D intensity across countries are less easily explained. In part, these
are due to the different configurations of industries across countries. Britain
stands out as having a relatively high level of R&D intensity in 1974 (second
only to the US), but by 1991 has one of the lowest of all the G7 countries (bar
Canada).
It could be argued that Britain was spending too much on R&D in the early
1970s and the decline is welcome.
15 Yet even those who argue that this pattern is
of no concern to policymakers should be interested in why Britain has
experienced a relative decline in its R&D intensity.
16 One explanation stresses
de- industrialisation. It is true that manufacturing declined faster in Britain than
elsewhere and that the bulk of R&D is concentrated in manufacturing.
Nevertheless, when one examines the ratio of R&D to GDP within
manufacturing, Britain’s performance remains poor. R&D intensity fell from 6.3
per cent in 1981 to 6.1 per cent in 1992
17 whereas it rose in all the other G7
countries. A second explanation could be that the ‘Peace Dividend’ is
responsible.
18 However, the stagnation of British R&D intensity began in 1981,
long before the end of the Cold War, and other countries with a large amount of
military R&D, such as France and the US, have not suffered so badly. One
underexplored possibility is that there are relatively greater shortages of skilled
workers in Britain, making R&D and innovation more expensive.
The composition as well as the quantity of R&D has evolved. As
multinationals have grown and the world’s markets have opened, R&D has
become more international in two senses.
19 First, more R&D is directed at
expanding sales in foreign markets. Secondly, R&D conducted domestically is
increasingly financed from overseas. In Britain, for example, the proportion of
total R&D financed from overseas rose from 6.9 per cent in 1983 to 11.7 per
cent in 1993. As a further example of the increased importance of foreign
markets, one can observe a rise in the ratio of foreign to domestic patents in
almost all countries. For example, in the US only 8 per cent of patents granted
were to foreigners in 1968, 38 per cent in 1978 and 46 per cent in 1992.
20 This
trend towards internationalisation is more pronounced for British and Canadian
corporations which performed a relatively larger proportion of their
technological activities overseas. According to Cantwell (1992) and Patel and
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Pavitt (1992), around 30 to 42 per cent of UK R&D was performed abroad,
while Hines (1993a) gives the US figure as closer to 10 per cent.
Another feature of R&D is that it is labour-intensive. R&D expenditure is
primarily current expenditure, the majority of which is comprised of salaries and
wages of scientists and engineers. As a consequence, much R&D knowledge is
embodied within individuals, and one important form of technological diffusion
is the movement of these individuals.
Finally, it must be borne in mind that formal R&D is heavily concentrated in
certain industrial sectors, and predominantly performed by the larger firms
within these sectors. Chemicals and engineering are generally the largest R&D
performers, with pharmaceuticals being a particularly high and successful R&D
spender in the UK. For example, in 1989 the 50 largest R&D spenders accounted
for 76.5 per cent of all British R&D expenditure and 73 per cent of all R&D
employment.
21 An implication of this concentration of R&D (which is higher
than the concentration of production) is that R&D subsidies will be enjoyed
disproportionately by a small number of firms.
IV. TAX TREATMENT OF R&D
In this section, the tax treatment of expenditure on R&D in six OECD countries
is discussed, and in the next section, its impact on the price of conducting R&D
is presented. Investment in R&D is treated more favourably than investment in
physical capital in most countries through accelerated depreciation allowances
and tax credits. The tables below present only a very simplified description of
the tax systems. The rates shown are the ones used in calculating the cost-of-
capital figures. The Appendix gives a more detailed description of the tax
systems.
The first column in Table 2 shows the statutory corporate income tax rate.
The next four columns show the rate at which plant and machinery and buildings
are allowed to be depreciated for calculating tax liability. In many countries,
there is a variety of rates and methods of calculating depreciation allowances.
The ones shown in the table are the ones used in the calculations below and are
generally an average of the actual rates.
Four of the countries give a tax credit on R&D expenditure as shown in Table
3. These sometimes apply to incremental spending above a base, the idea being
to provide a subsidy to marginal investment but not to inframarginal R&D. In
addition, the definition of R&D expenditure varies significantly from country to
country.
The tax treatment of R&D in two other countries is worth mentioning,
although we do not discuss them in detail here. Australia gives a tax credit of 50
per cent on all R&D spending, which is more generous than any of the measures
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mentioned above. The Netherlands has introduced the idea of allowing the tax
credit to be deducted from the firm’s payroll tax, which effectively avoids any














b 22.8 25.0 100.0 4.0 4.0
France 33.3 35.7 50.0 5.0 5.0
Germany
c 48.4 30.0 30.0 10.0 10.0
Japan
d 50.0 30.0 30.0 6.6 6.6
UK
e 33.0 25.0 25.0 4.0 4.0
US
f 35.0 28.6 28.6 3.2 3.2
Note: Plant and machinery is depreciated by the straight-line method in all countries except Canada, where it is
by declining balance, and buildings is depreciated by declining balance in all countries.
a This is the statutory tax rate for retained earnings.
b This is the federal tax rate less provincial abatement, plus federal surtax of 3 per cent and less manufacturing
or processing profits deduction. Additional provincial tax at an average of 11.9 per cent is also included in the
calculations below.
c Additional trade tax (Gewerbesteauer) of 13 per cent is also included in the calculations below.
d This is made up of national, enterprise and inhabitants corporation tax.
e This does not include the allowances for ‘scinetific research’.
f Additional state taxes at an average of 6.5 per cent are also included in the calculations below.
Other Tax Incentives
Preferential tax rates are a way of encouraging successful investment and
innovation as opposed to just any investment, but are not commonly used.
23 A
separate and lower statutory tax rate applies to any profits earned from
innovative investment or activity. The obvious problem is in defining which
income comes from the specified activity, and therefore this incentive may work
best on smaller firms which only engage in a limited number of activities. It may
also be the case that even R&D that does not lead to successful innovation is
useful.
Another form of incentive which has not been put into practice but which is
advocated by Stoneman (1987) is a levy–grant system. The system could be
organised at the industry level and could involve all members of the industry
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paying a levy which was redistributed proportionally to R&D. This sort of a
scheme has several attractions, although many (largely administrative)
drawbacks.
TABLE 3
Tax Credit for R&D
Credit rate Definition of qualifying R&D
Canada 20% R&D expenditure within Canada, as well as payments to others for
conducting R&D.
France 50% Incremental R&D expenditure within France over the average of
the preceding two years, adjusted for inflation.
Germany — —
Japan 20% Incremental R&D expenditure over the largest amount spent in
any year since 1996 up to a maximum of per cent of total
corporation tax liability.
UK — —
US 20% Incremental R&D expenditure within the US over the company’s
‘fixed-base-percentage’ times its average annual gross receipts
over the preceding four taxation years.
V. IMPACT OF TAX TREATMENT
￿
In this section, the tax treatment of investment in R&D is compared with that of
capital investment. This comparison can be made in several ways. Expenditure
on a ‘typical’ R&D investment can be compared with that on a ‘typical’ capital
investment where the compositions of the two investments are different.
Differences in the cost of capital arise mainly because current expenditure on
R&D is treated as an investment from an economic point of view, while other
current expenditure is not. A large part of current expenditure on R&D relates to
the salaries of scientists and technicians, the full value of which will accrue over
several years. An alternative comparison can be made between a specific
investment (for example, a given piece of machinery) purchased for use in the
R&D laboratory or for production. Both of these comparisons are presented
below.
The numbers presented in Tables 4 and 5 are the rate of return required
before tax to earn a return of 5 per cent after tax.
24 This calculation is a function
of the tax rates and the tax base and is also affected by the type of finance used,
the inflation rate and other economic variables. In this analysis, we have
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assumed that all investment is financed by retained earnings
25 and that inflation
is 5 per cent in all countries.
The first column in Table 4 shows the required rate of return for a typical
investment in physical capital. The investment is assumed to be entirely
domestic and undertaken by a large firm with tax liability. In this analysis, no
account is taken of small companies, regional allowances or any other special
provisions.
26 In the remaining columns, an investment in R&D is considered,
made up of 90 per cent current expenditure and 10 per cent capital expenditure.
27
The second column shows the required rate of return for a ‘typical’ R&D
investment, as if it were treated like capital investment for tax purposes. The
differences between the first two columns arise because of the different
composition of the two investments. Since current expenditure is fully
deductible, the figures in the second column are all about 5 per cent, the required
post-tax rate of return.
TABLE 4














Canada 7.2 5.2 -4.9 -4.9 -0.7
France 6.6 5.2 1.1 2.9 3.8
Germany 8.9 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4
Japan 8.8 5.4 3.2 4.1 4.6
UK 7.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2
US 7.6 5.3 3.5 4.3 4.7
Note: The following assumptions have been made: the ‘typical’ investment in capital is 36 per cent in buildings
and 64 per cent in plant and machinery; the ‘typical’ investment in R&D is 90 per cent in current expenditure,
4 per cent in buildings and 6 per cent in plant and machinery; economic depreciation rates are 3.6 per cent
buildings, 12.25 per cent for plant and machinery and 15-30 per cent for current R&D (the real economic
depreciation rate of R&D is estimated to be around 15-30 per cent ; see, for example, Griliches and Mairesse
(1984) and Pakes and Schankerman (1984); inflation is 5 per cent for all countries; investment is financed by
retained earnings; R&D growth is 10-20 per cent per annum.
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TABLE 5
Pre-Tax Rate of Return for Given Capital Investment
Building Plant and machinery
Capital investment R&D investment Capital investment R&D investment
Canada 8.2 7.2 6.6 -0.3
France 7.3 6.2 6.2 3.9
Germany 9.7 9.7 8.4 8.4
Japan 9.8 8.7 8.2 7.0
UK 7.6 7.6 6.9 6.9
US 8.7 8.3 6.9 6.0
Note: The following assumptions have been made: economics depreciation rates are 3.6 per cent for buildings,
12.5 per cent for plant machinery and 30 per cent for current R&D; inflation is 5 per cent for all countries;
investment is financed by retained earnings; weights and depreciation  rates are from OECD (1991).
In the last three columns, the accelerated depreciation allowances and tax
credits detailed in Tables 2 and 3 are included using different assumptions about
the depreciation rate and annual growth rate of R&D. For countries with a tax
credit, there is a large impact, though the size of the impact is sensitive to the
assumptions made. Canada has by far the most generous credit because it applies
to all R&D spending, not just the incremental amount. The US and Japanese
incremental credits are rather less generous than the French one simply because
of the rate. For firms without a tax liability, the French credit would be relatively
more generous as it is fully refundable after four years.
Canada and France also give accelerated depreciation allowances for R&D
capital expenditure, although they have less impact because only a small
proportion of the R&D investment is in capital goods. The value of these
additional allowances is the amount of the allowance times the statutory tax rate,
which means that they are worth more when the tax rate is high. Tax credits, on
the other hand, are offset against a company’s tax liability and therefore their
value is not dependent on the tax rate.
In Table 5, the pre-tax rate of return required to earn 5 per cent after tax on a
given capital investment is shown when it is for R&D purposes and when it is
not. The first two columns consider an investment in an industrial building and
the second two an investment in plant and machinery. Canada offers the most
generous tax treatment of R&D investment, with France, Japan and the US
giving some tax advantage.
Comparing the required rate of return figures in Table 5 with the R&D
intensity data in Table 1, it appears that the tax treatment of R&D has little
correlation with the amount of R&D done. Canada, for example, has the most
generous tax treatment of R&D and yet has the lowest R&D intensity. This
observation has led many to conclude that tax incentives have little impact on theTax Incentives for R&D
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amount of R&D performed. This conclusion may be unwarranted. First, there are
numerous other factors affecting the amount of R&D that will vary from country
to country. It could be that in the absence of these incentives, the amount of
R&D done would be even lower. Secondly, the required rate of return will differ
between firms and it is necessary to look at disaggregated data to determine the
manner in which tax incentives affect firms’ behaviour. The relationship
between tax incentives and R&D can only be fully understood by examining the
response of individual firms to independent changes in the price of R&D.
Research results in this area are discussed below.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
This section outlines some of the practical problems that have arisen with the
implementation of tax credits. The US Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,
which introduced a tax credit for R&D, and its subsequent revisions are used as
an example.
28 The problems can be generalised to other schemes. Five problems
that arise in the implementation of these tax measures are considered. They
relate to design, permanency, relabelling, the definition of the base and the
interaction of the credit with other parts of the tax system.
The most obvious problem with design is that the social rate of return is
generally unknown. It almost certainly varies across industries and over time, yet
designing a credit to reflect these differences is all but impossible, given our
current state of knowledge. The actual rate of the credit chosen in different
countries is inevitably the result of a complex political bargaining process even
when there is a cross-party consensus on the need for a tax credit.
29
In the US case, the form of the tax credit was altered substantially in its scope
and generosity from year to year, and it still has not been made a permanent
feature of the US tax system. The uncertainty over the level and future existence
of the credit meant that firms were slow to react because of the large adjustment
costs of R&D. Economists
30 argue that these costs stem from the fact that it is
very difficult to hire and fire the highly-skilled R&D personnel who make up the
bulk of R&D expenditures. R&D investment projects are usually long-term and
spending shows little variation year to year compared with capital investment.
Large changes to R&D budgets are costly and corporations are unlikely to incur
the costs unless they can be sure that the lower R&D prices induced by the credit
are not going to be reversed 12 months later. The uncertainty created by the
constant change in the US case surely undermined the effectiveness of the credit,
especially in its early years.
                                                                                                                                   
28 See Hall (1993) or Hines (1993a and 1993b) for details.
29 The US tax credit detailed below was introduced in 1981 by President Reagan with support from the
Democrats.
30 See, for example, Himmelberg and Peterson (1994).Fiscal Studies
34
A third major problem relates to the relabelling of other costs as ‘R&D’
following the introduction of a credit scheme. The rather imprecise definition of
R&D adds to this problem. Mansfield and Switzer (1985) argued from survey
evidence that reported Canadian R&D expenditures increased by 14 per cent
between 1978 and 1982 because of redefinition following the introduction of the
credit.
31 Nevertheless, companies have always had an incentive to exaggerate
R&D because it is expensed. Relabelling is likely to be a problem primarily at
the introduction of the scheme. Government auditors in the US and Australia did
not find widespread abuse of the scheme.
While tax credits stimulate new investment, they also subsidise spending that
would have taken place in the absence of the credit. To limit the cost and to try
to target the credit at ‘new’ spending, a number of countries have incremental
schemes where only R&D above a defined base qualifies for the tax allowance.
The difficulties of designing an incremental scheme are highlighted by
Eisner, Albert and Sullivan (1984) and Inland Revenue and HM Treasury (1987).
Eisner et al. evaluated the impact of the US tax credit by calculating the value of
the marginal effective tax credit (METC). The METC measures the discounted
present value of the credit — that is, it accounts for the future stream of marginal
benefits that will accrue from the credit.
32
 They found the METC to be very low — on average zero for 1980 and 4 per
cent for 1981 — and negative for around one-fifth of firms.
33 This surprising
feature of the tax credit arose for three main reasons: the incremental nature of
the credit; the company-specific moving-average definition of the base; and the
fact that many firms (ranging between 14 per cent and 43 per cent) could not
claim the credit due to tax exhaustion.
The incremental nature of the credit meant that if expenditure in a particular
year was below the base then no credit accrued in that year. If expenditure was
above the base then for each additional R&D dollar spent, a credit of $0.25
accrued. The credit rate was limited to expenditure up to two times base so that
                                                                                                                                   
31 Canada has made several amendments to the definition of qualifying R&D expenditure in an attempt to
minimise the relabelling problem.
32 Consider a credit rate of 25 per cent. Take a company that is planning to increase its R&D every year over
the next three years and stands to enjoy the full credit (i.e. no tax exhaustion or ceiling on the credit). Since the
credit uses the nominal value of R&D, increases in R&D will be the rule every year because of inflation. The
interest rate is i. The METC will be 25 1 1 1
3 1
3





 Thus if i = 0.15, the METC is only about 6 per
cent.
33 Negative credits can arise when a firm is considering an increase in its R&D spending that will leave it
below the base in its current year, but expects to be above the base in subsequent years. No tax credits will
accrue from the increase in R&D in the current year, but the increased base will reduce the size of the credit in
subsequent years.Tax Incentives for R&D
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for spending over this ceiling, each additional R&D dollar earned a credit of
only $0.125.
34
However, the important point about the way the base was defined (as a three-
year moving average) was that, when a firm increased its R&D expenditure in
one year and planned to increase it in the next year as well, then the METC for
the next year was reduced by the first year’s expenditure because of the increase
in the base. Thus the credit was most generous to firms spending more than base
in the current year but anticipating no future credits.
Eisner et al. recommended that the credit could be refundable so as not to
depend on the firm’s tax position, effectively turning the credit into a grant
system. Although the US tax credit did not evolve in this direction, the French
tax credit has this feature.
In 1991, the base was redefined to be an amount determined by multiplying a
firm’s 1984–88 R&D/sales ratio by its average annual growth sales over the
previous four years. This new definition does not fully solve the problem unless
the government is prepared to assume that technological conditions will remain
static for the rest of the company’s lifetime. Fixing the base at an industry
average would be attractive, but then one is faced with the need to locate a multi-
industry firm in a particular industry.
Another problem with the implementation of an R&D tax credit is its
interaction with other aspects of the tax system. It relies on the company having
a tax liability against which the credit can be offset. While there are generally
provisions for carry forward of unused credits, their value is significantly
reduced since cash tomorrow is not worth as much as cash today.
Altshuler (1988) investigated the incentive effects of the US credit using
firm- level tax-return data and incorporated the dynamics of firms’ tax positions.
This work gave a more detailed picture of the incentives firms faced over time.
By 1983, 64 per cent of firms could not fully offset their tax credit and thus had
to carry forward their credits, greatly reducing their value. While in 1981 almost
three-quarters of qualifying R&D was eligible for a credit, by 1984 the figure
had dropped to 54 per cent. The firm-level METCs were highly variable between
–11 per cent and +20 per cent. The main conclusion of this work was that when
asymmetric taxation was accounted for, the value of the credit was found to be
dramatically lower than the headline rate.
Hines (1993a) examined the impact that the tax reforms of the late 1980s had
on the location of R&D performed by US multinationals. One aspect of these
reforms was to change the rules governing the amount of R&D that can be
apportioned to domestic and foreign income. The idea behind the reform was to
provide incentives for R&D that was aimed at expanding domestic sales rather
than foreign sales. This change affected firms differently depending on their
                                                                                                                                   
34 Other countries have put an absolute cap on how much tax credit a company can receive in a single year —
for example, in France the ceiling is FFr40 million.Fiscal Studies
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foreign tax credit position.
35 At the same time, other changes in tax law increased
the number of firms in an excess foreign tax credit position. Looking at
aggregate data, these changes appear to have had little effect on the amount of
R&D done by US multinationals in the US, largely because of the mixed
incentives produced by the reforms due to the interaction of various elements of
tax law.
VII. IMPACT OF DIFFERENCES IN PRICE
Even when differences in the after-tax price of R&D are observed, it is difficult
to determine how sensitive firms are to these prices. The price elasticity
indicates the proportional change in the amount of R&D activity in response to a
change in the price. Estimates of the own-price elasticity of R&D vary widely.
Throughout the 1980s, empirical work had suggested an elasticity of less than –
0.5. In other words, a 10 per cent fall in the price of R&D would induce a 5 per
cent increase in its quantity. However, more recent studies indicate that the
elasticity may be close to, or even less than, –1.0. Table 6 shows some of the
estimates that have been obtained using disaggregated data.
TABLE 6
Estimates of Own-Price Elasticity of R&D
Study Sample Elasticity
Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989 US manufacturing firms -0.4 to -0.5
a
Nadiri and Prucha, 1989 US Bell telephone companies Zero
Bailey and Lawrence, 1992 Industry data -1.0
Hall, 1993 US manufacturing firms -0.84 to -2.7
Hines, 1993a US multinationals -1.2 to -1.8
a Note that this refers to an elasticity of the stock of R&D capital with respect to the R&D cost of capital. In the
long run, this will be the same as the elasticity with respect to the flow of R&D; but in the short run, if R&D
depreciates at less than 100 per cent, the elasticity with respect to the flow of R&D impled by rge estimates will
be higher.
One example of the revisionists is Hall (1993), whose work made several
advances over previous studies. Her model has a strong grounding in economic
theory and explicitly models the behavioural response of companies to changes
in the price of R&D. Using data on over 1,000 US manufacturing firms from
1980 to 1991, Hall quantified the impact of the R&D tax credit on the level of
investment in R&D. She found that, while the effective credit rate was small, it
elicited a strong price response. Her results indicated that additional R&D
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spending of the order of $2 billion per year was stimulated at an annual cost of
around $1 billion in forgone tax revenue.
36
While these estimates are presented with a high margin of error, Hall’s work
convincingly demonstrates that, over a longer time period, the US tax credit did
stimulate some new R&D investment. Hall emphasises the point that the
uncertainty over the future of the tax credit coupled with adjustment costs meant
that behavioural responses were hard to identify in the early years of the credit.
‘... the typical manufacturing firm has an enormous incentive to smooth the
acquisition of R&D capital, and this greatly inhibits the effectiveness of
temporary tax instruments.’
Another form of evidence is survey data — what firms say about the impact
of tax rules on their investment behaviour. Mansfield (1986) conducted a survey
of top executives in 55 firms in Canada, 40 in Sweden and 110 in the US, asking
them to assess the relevance of tax incentives to their R&D spending. He found
very small reported increases to R&D as a result of tax incentives (of the order
of 1–2 per cent). Although these findings were much in line with Eisner et al.’s
(1984) evaluation of the US tax credit, they sit uneasily with the later work of
Hall and others. Unfortunately, follow-up surveys have not been attempted for
more recent years to determine whether managers’ views have changed over
time.
There is a more limited amount of information available on the UK and
Europe. The Ruding Committee Report (Commission of the European
Communities, 1992) included a survey of firms from the EU, asking whether tax
was a major factor in locational decisions. Of the 349 responses, over one-third
said that tax was always a relevant consideration in the location of R&D centres,
15 per cent said it was always a major factor and a further 25 per cent said that it
was sometimes a major factor. These figures compare with over 50 per cent who
stated it was always a major factor in the location of a financial service centre
and over 20 per cent who said it was always a major factor in the location of
production plant.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
What can be concluded about the desirability of new fiscal incentives for R&D?
First and foremost, one must be clear about whether moves to increase
aggregate R&D intensity have real economic justification. There are strong
reasons to suspect market failures are endemic due to the difficulties of
appropriating the benefits of knowledge. Nevertheless, large countries near the
technological frontier, such as Japan, may have more need to invest in R&D than
smaller countries further away from the frontier, such as the UK. For smaller
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countries, R&D will have a much more important role in speeding the diffusion
of best-practice techniques than in generating world-beating innovations.
Even if one is convinced that R&D is ‘too low’, policymakers need to be
clear whether R&D tax incentives are the best method of raising the level of
investment. If the problem is primarily an issue of the operation of financial
markets or the availability of skilled labour rather than one of spillovers, then
policies directed at providing cheaper finance for research or training the labour
force seem more appropriate than generalised tax breaks. Knowledge of the
causes of underinvestment in R&D is still very primitive and more research
needs to be done to establish what are the causal mechanisms.
What has the existing research shown about the effectiveness of tax breaks?
The estimates of the costs of conducting R&D in the six OECD countries shown
reveal that tax policies provide substantial advantages to R&D vis-à-vis other
sorts of investment. The evaluation of the empirical work suggests that the US
tax credit experiment in the 1980s was successful in raising the levels of R&D in
a relatively cost-effective way. But one must be wary of transplanting US
findings directly to other countries.
One of the distinguishing features of the US economy is its sheer size. Other
industrialised countries are far more reliant on overseas markets. The R&D
performed in the European economies is predominantly by multinationals which
may be more sensitive to small changes in the price of R&D between countries.
This greater sensitivity could be seen as a boon or a burden. It may mean that the
responsiveness of firms in Europe would be even greater than that of their
American counterparts. Yet there is a danger that if the main effects of an R&D
tax credit is merely to redistribute R&D amongst nations, it will become a
globally inefficient ‘beggar-my-neighbour policy’. Other countries could
retaliate and the usual problems of tax rivalry would emerge.
Important lessons have been learnt from the experience of the US and other
countries in the difficulties of implementing a tax credit. Relabelling expenses as
R&D remains a problem and some of the extra R&D costs incurred are surely
illusory. However, the expensing of R&D in most countries has always given
firms some incentive to relabel.
The interaction of R&D allowances with other aspects of the tax system is a
key issue, as illustrated by Hines’s work. In the UK, the problem of surplus
advance corporation tax (ACT), which arises when firms with large overseas
interests pay dividends out of their overseas profits,
37 also affects R&D
expenditure. This problem provides firms with incentives to shift costs, such as
R&D, overseas. For many firms, the negative incentive given by surplus ACT
could easily overwhelm any positive impact a domestic tax credit might have,
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especially if the R&D credit must be taken into account before foreign tax
credits.
Many countries have R&D tax credits of one sort or another and the recent
US evidence suggests that there may be substantial increases in private sector
R&D due to such credits. Simply transplanting a US-style scheme has many
difficulties including its relocational effects, relabelling and the interaction of
the credit with other parts of the tax system. Implementation is far from
straightforward, as the experience of other countries has shown, especially with
regard to the design of the base where an incremental credit is used.
Nevertheless, if policymakers do seek an increase in aggregate R&D, then tax
credits appear a feasible and attractive option, albeit one fraught with peril. An
internationally co-ordinated response to the problems of R&D would be more in
the spirit of tax harmonisation than unilateral action by a single government.
APPENDIX: OVERVIEW OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR R&D
IN SIX OECD COUNTRIES
Canada
Taxpayers have the option of deducting qualifying scientific research and
experimental development (SRED) expenses or claiming an investment tax
credit of 20 per cent of qualifying expenditures. SRED includes both current and
capital expenditures (but not on buildings). Where SRED is carried on outside
Canada, only current expenditures incurred in the year can be deducted.
Expenditure that qualifies for the tax credit includes SRED carried out in
Canada, as well as payments to others that undertake SRED in Canada. Unused
tax credits can be carried back three years and forward 10 years, or, in respect of
certain taxpayers, refunded if unused (subject to certain limitations). A number
of provinces in Canada also offer provincial incentives
38 and there are enhanced
benefits for Canadian-controlled private corporations.
France
Taxpayers can deduct current expenditure in the year incurred, write off capital
expenditure under accelerated depreciation rates, and receive a 50 per cent
incremental tax credit (subject to a ceiling of FFr40 million per annum) on the
increase in qualifying R&D expenditure over the average R&D expenditure in
the preceding two years (adjusted for inflation). For depreciation purposes,
scientific or technical research includes activities that have the character of basic
research, applied research or development activities. A more limited definition
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applies for the purposes of the incremental tax credit. Only domestic R&D
qualifies for deduction or accelerated depreciation unless the company is
permitted to consolidate its accounts, in which case R&D carried out by foreign
operations also qualifies. For the purposes of the incremental tax credit, only
R&D expenses incurred in France qualify. A reduction in research expenses does
not require the repayment of any previous credits, but 50 per cent of the shortfall
must be offset against the tax credit obtained in a subsequent year. Unused tax





Current expenditures for R&D can be deducted in the year incurred, or amortised
and deducted over a period not exceeding five years. An incremental tax credit
of 20 per cent of additional R&D expenditure is available. Qualifying
expenditure includes the cost of materials, salaries and wages of employees
engaged exclusively in R&D work, and other current expenses, as well as
depreciation of machinery and equipment used for such work and amortisation of
research expenses. For the purposes of the incremental credit, the expenditure
base is defined as the largest amount of expenditure incurred in any previous
accounting period since 1966. Several other restrictions apply, such as a
maximum credit in any year of 10 per cent of the corporation’s tax liability.
There are several allowances for accelerated depreciation rates and an alternative
fixed-rate tax credit of 6 per cent instead of the incremental tax credit for small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
UK
Current expenses are deductible when incurred. Expenditure of a capital nature
on ‘scientific research’ may be deducted in the year incurred. Scientific research
is defined as ‘activities in the fields of natural or applied science for the
extension of knowledge’. The Inland Revenue adopts a narrow interpretation of
what constitutes an ‘extension of knowledge’.
US
Current expenditures are fully deductible in the year incurred, although the
taxpayer may elect to amortise such expenses over a period not more than 60
months. There are no accelerated depreciation provisions for capital expenditure.
Taxpayers can either deduct R&D expenses or claim a federal tax credit of 20
per cent of incremental spending. Qualifying R&D expenses are broadly definedTax Incentives for R&D
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as either qualifying in-house research expenses or qualifying contract research
expenses paid to third parties, although only 65 per cent of the latter qualify.
Research conducted outside the US is excluded, and there are rules governing
the allocation of domestic R&D between domestic and foreign activities so that
credit is only given in respect of the former. The expenditure base for the
incremental credit is determined by multiplying the company’s ‘fixed-base
percentage’ (the ratio of qualifying R&D expenses to gross receipts in the
company’s taxation years beginning after 1983 and ending before July 1989, to a
maximum of 16 per cent) by its average annual gross receipts over the preceding
four taxation years. Special rules apply for computing the credit for start-up
companies. A number of states offer their own incentives as well.
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